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Spirituality, Economics, and Education: A Dialogic Critique of 
"Spiritual Capital." 
 
By J. Gregory Keller and Rob Helfenbein 
 [T]he right has been able to take certain elements that many people hold 
dear and connect them with other issues in ways that might not often occur 
‘naturally’ if these issues were less politicized. (Apple 2001, pp.220-221) 
In the ultimate sense spiritual capital is the missing leg in the stool of 
economic development, which includes its better known relatives, social 
and human capital. (Malloch 2003, p.2) 
 
The belief that the truth of a theory is the same as its productiveness is 
clearly unfounded. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1991, p. 244) 
 
 In 2005, the Spiritual Capital Research Program announced a $3.75 million grant 
“to catalyze the emergence of a productive, vital and interdisciplinary research field of 
spiritual capital in the social sciences, with particular attention to building connections to 
economics” (Spiritual Capital Research Program 2005). This particular work, 
commissioned by the Metanexus Institute and the John Templeton Foundation is, as we 
argue in the following dialogue, an exemplar of neoliberal rhetoric taking aim at the 
economic uses of spirituality in a globalized world. Based in a conservative think tank 
with ties to the American Enterprise Institute and using such neoconservative thinkers as 
Francis Fukuyama, this project is, we contend, a veiled example of the “conservative 
restoration” at work (Apple 2000; 2001; Shudak & Helfenbein, 2005).  
 Traditionally, spirituality has functioned in three ways in everyday life. First, it 
has answered deep and often pressing questions concerning the meaning of human life, 
the suffering associated with loss and deprivation, and the fears and hopes connected with 
boundary situations such as birth and death. Second, it has legitimized existing power 
relations. Third, it has resisted those same power relations (see, for instance, Chopp 1986; 
Cobb 2000; Cobb 2002). The question we wish to address arises from the methodical and 
alarming co-opting of significant human values by the subtle rhetoric of a 
neoliberal/neoconservative agenda such that the resistance to hegemony historically 
available through spirituality is instead turned into another form of acquiescence (Cobb 
2002; Lakoff 2004; McCutcheon 2005). 
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 We offer a moral critique of the co-option of one major aspect of cultural capital 
by an agenda that aspires to strengthen certain religious sub-cultures by showing their 
value in maintaining a “one-dimensional” (Marcuse 1991) economic and cultural system. 
Our approach relies upon, on the one hand, an idea of the social and political significance 
of moral thinking (Arendt 1971; Keller 2005) and, on the other hand, an analysis of some 
rhetorical devices employed by the Right that conflate freedom with the “free market” 
and represent their agenda as simple “common sense” (Shudak & Helfenbein, 2005). The 
authors, in explicit opposition to the ideology at work in this project on spiritual capital, 
present a response as a counter move in the hopes of articulating a broad tactic that is 
directed against the forces of cultural production employed by the Right. 
 This paper consists of a conversation between a philosopher specialising in ethics 
and religion and an educational researcher with an interest in cultural studies and 
contemporary social theory. Dialogic in form, this paper employs an interdisciplinary 
response to an interdisciplinary project and offers the following components: 
• a dialogic theorizing of the implications for education of a research project on 
spiritual capital; 
• a continuation of the project of analyzing moral thinking in various cultural and 
societal settings; 
• a continuation of the project of analyzing political rhetoric (towards an 
understanding of the polemics of political rhetoric); 
• a reaffirmation of the value of recognizing difference and ambiguity in the global 
moment. 
 
 Pairing spirituality with economics empowers a vision of education as a first line 
of defense against the alleged risks of allowing for diversity and critical questioning 
(Doerr 1998). Neoliberals/neoconservatives thus produce another rhetorical shift of 
meaning by which to reduce dissent and resistance to the level of an anti-patriotic, anti-
religious, anti-value menace to the United States and its vision of global dominance 
(Lakoff 2004; McCutcheon 2005; Carter 1998). This dialogue represents an effort to 
present a counter-balance to that rhetoric. In pursuit of these goals, the authors have 
decided on four major themes and attendant questions that serve to frame the inquiry in 
the spiritual capital project of both philosophy and cultural studies. 1 The themes are: 
1. Modernity: Two essential features of modernity lie in an attempt to gain 
“rational” control over all things and an attempt to “create its normativity out of 
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itself” (Habermas, 1990). How does the notion of spiritual capital relate to these 
goals? 
 
2. Utility: Can every aspect of life be appropriately subsumed under the mantle of 
usefulness? What takes us beyond usefulness? 
 
3. Doubt: Doubt can be used as a tool for attaining certainty (Descartes) or for 
creating need (advertising or propaganda). In science/philosophy/spirituality 
doubt instead represents an attitude of accepting ambiguity and uncertainty (with 
at open mind; as prods to questioning). Can we stand questions and dialogue, 
rather than turning incessantly to answers and polemics?  
 
4. Wonder: Wonder points to wonders – the unexplained as well as the 
inexplicable. How do we allow wonder to open avenues of escape (points of 
resistance) from under the crushing weight of Modernity, Utility, and Doubt? 
 
 
1. Modernity: Two essential features of modernity lie in an attempt to gain 
“rational” control over all things and an attempt to “create its normativity out of 
itself” (Habermas, 1990). How does the notion of spiritual capital relate to these 
goals? 
 
 In the beginning discussion of economic development, Malloch (2003) describes 
the “redemptive hopes and expectations” of efforts at global development and continues 
to describe development efforts as religious activity (p.7). Echoing notions of faithful 
stewardship familiar in Christian thought, the rhetoric of spiritual capital follows the 
missionary zeal of saving the people of the developing world from themselves. 
Economic development can be viewed as creative management of endowed 
resources by stewards who act on their faith commitments. Here, genuine 
economic growth is guided by normative laws, character, and principled habits 
and practices that take into account the preservation needs of human beings, their 
environments, and their physical, mental, social, cultural, and spiritual lives. In 
the ultimate sense, spiritual capital may be the third leg in the stool which 
includes its better known relatives, namely: human and spiritual capital. (Malloch, 
2003, p.7) 
 
Certainly, in this example, one can see the attempt to “create its normativity out 
of itself” as the ‘norming’ function of spirituality is not only recognized but also praised. 
It is here that we argue that the project for conceptualizing spiritual capital falls into the 
arena of a broader struggle for modernity and note that what might be unique about 
these efforts is not their mere existence, but also their openness to public discourse. 
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Further, we are operating under the assumption that the bar set for these analyses of 
spiritual capital—although likely to be denied—is a particular brand of American 
Protestantism as it stands to reason that the dominance of the United States in the new 
global economic order privileges its own spiritual characteristics. Again, the project 
works to create its normativity. 
John Cobb, Professor of Theology Emeritus at the Claremont School of Theology 
and well-known process theologian, critiques the collusion between Christianity and 
economics by pointing to the critical distance between the ideas and practices essential to 
the Christian spiritual tradition and the worldview and accompanying practices espoused 
by much of current economics (2000, 2002). First, he notes that academic understandings 
of the world typical of modernity rest on a particular metaphor: all systems within the 
World, including human beings, function as purely mechanical objects (2002). Most of 
the great spiritual traditions, however, see the world primarily in organic rather than 
mechanical terms. From the outset, Cobb claims, it has been not only people operating 
within the conceptual structure of the physical sciences but also those within the social 
sciences, and even within the tradition of the humanities, who represent the world in 
mechanical terms. Thus the very structure of knowledge, and the political, personal, and 
cultural composition of everyday life that draws upon that knowledge, has no room for 
spirit except as it is smuggled in or assumed in a manner that ignores the dissonance 
between the mechanical and the spiritual. 
 A second critical point brought up by Cobb arises from his first point. The 
mechanical worldview, for all its conceptual fecundity, takes apart pieces of the world’s 
inevitable complexity for the sake of analysis (2002). Such analysis can result in truly 
astonishing new perspectives concerning the nature of the physical, biological, and social 
entities roaming the world. The problem that hides at the heart of analysis unfolds as soon 
as we recognize a concomitant disconnection between part and whole. A friend of mine 
once tried to repair his car. When he was finished he had a box of parts left over, and the 
car wouldn’t run. While in most cases an adept mechanic could put a car back together 
after disassembling it, we are, at least at present, far less able to put a living body back 
together and even less successful at restoring order to the emotional and spiritual aspects 
of a person. 
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 A corollary problem to that of analysis lies in the particular emphasis placed on 
the results of that analysis. So, for example, economists frequently see money, wealth, or 
societal indices of wealth as the key to understanding the function of society (2002). 
Cobb makes the obvious point that Christian (and Buddhist) perspectives cannot agree 
with placing wealth at the center of social and political life. He says, “[W]e deeply, 
fundamentally, oppose placing the quest for wealth first” (2002). He says further that, 
from either the Christian or Buddhist perspective, “Justice, peace, and meeting the basic 
needs of all are much higher priorities than simply increasing overall wealth” (2002). But 
the problem of economic analysis lies deeper yet. Some contemporary economists have 
seen the grave difficulties posed by analysis simply in terms of wealth.2 But one need not 
look to religious voices or to our contemporaries for an objection to putting wealth at the 
center of social concerns. Aristotle explained it quite simply by saying that wealth cannot 
be the highest aim of human life for the simple reason that wealth necessarily has 
secondary status; it is always sought for what one can then do with it. 
 The greatest difficulty with the economic outlook, according to Cobb, lies in its 
“particular view of human beings,” which is “an abstraction from the fullness of human 
reality” (2002). He points to two particular parts of that abstraction. First, the standard 
economic view takes all rational human behavior to be strictly (and quite simple-
mindedly) self-interested and, second, takes all human beings to be possessed of (or by) 
“insatiable wants” (2002).3 At the very least these two claims ignore the breadth and 
depth of human interests on the one hand and set the scene for an industry oriented 
toward “creating unsatisfied wants” which fuel “an unsustainable system” (2002). 
 All of the previous points led to one over-riding set of claims: (1) “The only form 
of satisfaction that is recognized is that derived from the possession or consumption of 
desired goods and services” (2002), (2) the value of anything or anyone “is the price that 
someone is prepared to pay for it [or them]”; i.e. all objects, events, processes, and people 
are seen as commodities (2002), and (3) concerning what Cobb calls economism, he says, 
“I think of it as the first truly successful world religion” (2000). He follows up that last 
point by saying why he passionately rejects economism as a viable world view. He 
believes that the economic growth at which it aims “does not improve the economic 
condition of real people” (2000); that even if major economic changes were to reduce the 
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numbers of the “desperately poor,” the policies that strengthen economic growth “will 
destroy the natural basis for our life together long before they resolve the problem of 
poverty” (2000); and that “these economic considerations fail to deal with the real needs 
of people” (2000). “Policies,” he says, “designed to improve the real quality of life of 
human beings will prove very different from those designed to increase production and 
consumption overall” (2000). 
 Cobb’s overall point is reminiscent of H. Richard Niebuhr’s (1993) claim that we 
cannot do without faith, the question facing us is faith in what? The spiritual aspects of 
life need not be confined to the perspective of one religion, or to any traditionally 
religious perspective at all. The spiritual resides in our capacity for wonder, in resistance 
to the totalizing and dehumanizing effects of mechanistic and oppressive worldviews, in 
what Nishitani (1983) calls the “Great Doubt” – that which calls into question our 
certainties, our repressive and obsessive rationalities, our submersion in privilege and 
games of power, our claims to knowledge and to making objects out of all things. 
Spirituality, from this perspective, lies not in Truth but in questioning, not in conquest but 
in openness, and, finally, not in control but in letting go. 
Pushing an analysis of economism even further, it seems not far a field to 
characterize the conflation of economics with spirituality as another set of moves toward 
the creation of subjects to a larger regime of power.  Connecting this to Cobb, to be seen 
as a commodity fundamentally changes the nature of what it means to be. And 
particularly since the current dominant political force in the United States – what 
Grossberg (2005) calls the New Conservative Alliance – represents the strange 
bedfellows of free market neoliberals and the current formation of the Religious Right, 
for those that might offer another perspective, understanding how such a conflation 
might operate seems increasingly imperative. Foucault (2003) suggests that the project of 
social analysis should be to “bring out…relations or operators of domination” (p.45) 
rather than studying power as some bounded subject or unitary force. It is here that the 
reader is reminded that those engaged in the project of studying spiritual capital as such 
neither represent such a unitary force, nor agree on the usefulness of the notion. 
However, as part of the attempt to understand the workings and cultural formations of 
late capitalism, the term begs the question, “what is at stake?” 
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To approach the stakes of this conceptualization, the intersections of these notions 
are critical. How then might the notion of spiritual capital work in the creation of 
subjects? How do normativity and subjectivity operate in this struggle for modernity? 
First, to follow Foucault (and later Giorgio Agamben) we turn to the question of 
sovereignty, since subjectification as a process lies in some legitimation of sovereign 
power. Sovereignty in this type of analysis includes three essential elements: 1) 
discussion of how subjects become subjects; 2) an assumption of the multiplicity of power 
that converges in all relations of power; and 3) how power is legitimated in something 
more basic than law (2003, pp.44-46). In the case of spiritual capital — and perhaps its 
most surprising attribute — the creation of subjects is explicit; they are just waiting to be 
born. Malloch (2003) offers “the concept is pregnant with possibilities drawing on the 
intersection of economics and religion…in the ultimate sense spiritual capital is the 
missing leg in the stool of economic development, which includes its better known 
relatives, social and human capital” (p.2). Fusing business rhetorical terminology and 
accepted management technique with a shallow reading of social theory, the notion of 
total human capital can be reduced to an equation (see Davenport 1999 cited in Malloch, 
p.4). While this tendency to reduce human behavior (and even value) to a quantifiable 
formula resonates in our earlier analysis of the context of shifting modernities, most 
striking is Malloch’s allusion to an even more mysterious variable in such machinations: 
the human connection to the work.  
 Not only is sovereignty in this case justified on the basic economic relations 
common in late capitalism but it is suggested that certain characteristics might tie 
workers to corporate operations ever more tightly, producing so-called comparative 
advantage (p.4). This connection of workers to work in the hopes of increasing 
productivity captures the language of spirituality in a discourse of “development…based 
on hope” (p.4), “development…[as] religious category” (p.7), and, most specifically, 
“the impact of religion on conduct and rules as employees and employers, consumers 
and producers; and citizens at every level of existence” (p.8). Recent social theorists 
have a term for such a precise descriptor: biopower (Foucault 2003; 1998; Hardt & 
Negri 2000, 2004). It is precisely the multiplicity of forces at work in this creation of 
subjects — economic, social, cultural and now, to be clear at least rhetorically, spiritual 
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— that productivity and profit, and for the sake of our argument, biopower itself is to 
increase. This leads to the third aspect of sovereignty: legitimation. 
For the sake of global capital, the argument for legitimacy hardly needs to be 
made. There is no question about the rhetoric of development itself. Fundamental 
questions regarding the nature of a globalized development effort (i.e. profits for whom?) 
and the larger question of what is at stake for those whose spiritual characteristics must 
be abandoned or adapted in order to capitalize on them remain out of bounds (an 
exception seems to be Berger & Hefner2003; Woodberry2003). So it is in this way that 
“what is at stake” in this conception of spiritual capital is yet another position in the 
struggle for modernity, utilizing the normative power of spiritual/religious institutions to 
foster development in ways neither questioned nor contradicted. Underlying all of this is 
the notion that spirituality serves a purpose beyond itself, it has use. 
 
2. Utility: Can every aspect of life appropriately (usefully?) by subsumed under the 
mantle of usefulness? What takes us beyond usefulness? 
 
 Our discussion of utility comes from the effort to characterize spirituality in the 
terms of capital, a language of exchange and use.  Calling spiritual capital the “third leg 
in the stool” (Malloch, 2003) and citing Pierre Bourdieu as inspiration for defining this 
subset of social/cultural capital (Berger & Hefner, 2003; Finke, 2003; Iannaccone & 
Klick, 2003), those scholars involved in planning this line of research have tended to de-
emphasize the theoretical implications of the concept of cultural capital and instead jump 
immediately to notions of use value (i.e. production and protection of capital, migration 
and transfer, and impact on organizational development and growth; see Finke 2003). 
Before offering a conception of spirituality as beyond usefulness, a quick detour through 
the theoretical context seems appropriate. 
Bourdieu’s importance to contemporary social theory is obvious, recognized 
(although mocked in Iannaccone & Klick 2003, p.3) by the scholars of spiritual capital. 
In reading the Outline of a Theory of Practice one sees connections to discourse theory, 
neo-Marxist analysis, and cultural studies ala Birmingham (2000). First thoughts on 
Bourdieu, remind me of the notion of people in a history not of their own making, making 
their own history. As a post-structuralist he resists a social formation in which force, or 
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rules, dictate social practice but rather, suggests a theorized habitus that delimits the 
possibilities of action and production. In other words, habitus is “a system of 
dispositions—a past which survives in the present and tends to perpetuate itself into the 
future” (Bourdieu 2000, p.82). But as these dispositions are not necessarily constant or 
inevitable, Bourdieu is interested in thinking about society as a “struggle of symbolic 
forces” (Madarasz, 2002).  This habitus serves to set the guidelines for both the 
perception of objects and the production of practices (Bourdieu, 2000 p.118). Bourdieu’s 
conception allows for both the social construction of meaning and the material 
improvisation of actors interacting with the social world. In this way, social practice, 
while restrained by the “schemes engendered by history,” still holds no guarantees in 
terms of the cognitive or linguistic practice that ensues (p.82). The parallel here with 
audience theory, or what Stuart Hall (1992) might call ‘encoding and decoding’, forms 
an essential framework for cultural studies analysis. It is precisely the possibility for 
improvisation — the spaces opened up — which allows a theorization that includes an 
explicit politics. It is here that Bourdieu’s theory is one of resistance, of revolutionary 
practice. It is here that Bourdieu would argue against intentionally bringing in 
spirituality to the realm of capital. 
 The habitus, as guidelines for both means of perception and practice, allows for 
an understanding of those actions in cultural practice that defy an economic logic. 
Theorists advocating a reproductive model of social hierarchy, especially in education, 
continually fall short of explaining the processes by which such limiting organizational 
structures and contradictory liberatory rhetoric can coexist.  As an alternative, 
Bourdieu’s description of the creation and social involvement in cultural capital provides 
both an understanding of seemingly non-economic behaviors and furthermore relates 
specifically to the impact of credentialism in modern society. In relation to schools, the 
cultural capital most valued and easily transferred into economic capital is notably 
absent from school curriculum. But perhaps most interestingly, Bourdieu suggests that 
the impact of cultural capital on social systems is one of distinguishing between 
individuals and positions. This form of objectification through credentials, which in 
modern society are transferred through educational institutions (but, in this case 
religious ones?), becomes reified into a false objectivity, another form of the 
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misrecognized mechanics of the social (p.187). Could the efforts at cataloguing spiritual 
capital be a better example? To list the characteristics of forms of spirituality and place 
them in some taxonomy of economic benefit reduces them to economic variables. In this 
way, spiritual credentials translate into economic benefit in a seemingly neutral way. 
This misrecognition of the history and processes of perpetuation in the social interactions 
in turn forms the common sense conceptions that form the habitus of a new form of class-
consciousness. The circle is complete; Bourdieu spins in his grave.  
Bourdieu’s commentary points out that the objectification that occurs in the move 
to credentialise leads to a misrecognition of inequity and even critique. Habitus then not 
only preserves the social hierarchy but also allows for those who benefit from it to enjoy 
the deception as social groups to lie to themselves, at every level. It follows that the 
efforts to categorize spirituality in terms of utility — as a form of capital — fit with and 
follow from Bourdieu’s logic of the legitimation through which the shift from recognizing 
individual gain is occluded by the presentation of objective positions such as 
“development.” In this way, as Bourdieu states,   
Gentle, hidden exploitation is the form taken by man’s exploitation of man [sic] 
whenever overt, brutal exploitation is impossible (Bourdieu, 2000, p.192) 
 
Now then, what to do? This reading of Bourdieu is not a hopeless one. Although the 
description has been kept brief, the possibility for revolutionary practice and social 
change resides in this critique. It would seem then that the possibility for social change 
comes in the historicizing (recognizing?) of the processes of social hierarchy, or moving 
the doxa. In other words, challenging the habitus as much as possible in order to address 
the inequities of the system. I’m vaguely reminded of Laclau and Mouffe and the 
utilization of both the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence to challenge social 
practice, using the postmodern dispersion to form temporary alliances in pursuit of 
political good.  
 
From the impact of spiritual capital on the habitus and thus on the individual 
embedded in society, we turn to the effects of this idea on religion itself. “Religion must 
not be considered from the viewpoint of its utility, any more than life should” (Nishitani, 
1983, p. 2). Keiji Nishitani, Buddhist philosopher of the Kyoto School, tells us that many 
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aspects of everyday life offer themselves to us as items to be used. Religion, he suggests, 
comes to us in an altogether different guise. Nishitani uses the word “religion” here not to 
designate religions, but to designate the underlying experience that lies beneath the 
external formalities of religions. In keeping with Nishitani’s concerns and with our 
current questions of spirituality and capital, the word “spirituality” will be substituted for 
his word “religion.” 
 How, then, does spirituality confront us so that we may not put it to use but 
instead become “a question to ourselves” (Nishitani p. 3) through it? It strikes us in the 
moments when our certainties, our self-sufficient self-representations, and our 
entertainments drop away and we see before us the “abyss [that] is always just underfoot” 
(p. 3). But, in moments of reflection, we need not wait for “death, nihility, or sin” (p. 3) 
to grab and shake us. We can, at any time, turn our eyes to what lies beneath, around, and 
in us all the time. “[The] fundamental conversion in life is occasioned by the opening up 
of the horizon of nihility at the ground of life” (p. 3) – in short, spirituality in this sense 
lies in facing the faceless, nameless mystery upon which we stand and to which we 
answer. 
 As human beings we face the danger of being so bound by the “wisdom” of our 
own cultural achievements that we take religion or spirituality as simply another means to 
accomplish our goals. In the business of making and using things, we simply do not 
notice that certain fundamental realities of life do not present themselves for shaping or 
for use. We may, of course, use for our own ends the results and rituals of religion; it is in 
fact a commonplace that religion gets used by individuals, by groups and governments, 
by the scrupulous and unscrupulous alike. Nishitani, however, points to an easy yet costly 
mistake we make in that process. We fail to realize that the core, experiential reality of 
religion can never be co-opted by us. The underlying mystery, the silence behind the 
words will not wait upon our purposes and will not become subject to our projects and 
strivings for control. 
 Nishitani quite simply points to the way that not only religion but also we we 
become objects of use. Here again, our conversation turns to the notion of subjects. How 
“we ourselves become objects of use” aptly describes the process of subjectification. But 
perhaps more importantly, the conception that there is at least the possibility of 
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something else—here described as the “Great Doubt”, or “the abyss underfoot” or even 
provocatively, “the underlying mystery”— points to such controversial terms in social 
theory as agency, resistance, and hope. Here we might point out that the dangers of 
economism already discussed lie not only on the political Right as vulgar Marxism 
suffers from the same tendency to reduce the sum of human interaction to the economic. 
The flaw in these types of analyses — even if it comes from political allies—resides in the 
failure to recognize the existence of these mysteries (i.e. agency, resistance, and hope). 
Further the great mystery of social critique may be that be in pushing the recognition of 
the Marxist maxim of people making their own history in conditions not of their own 
making into the more troubling arena of “yes, but how can it be so?” What might be said 
to be missing in either modernist critique is doubt. 
 
3. Doubt: Doubt can be used as a tool for attaining certainty (Descartes) or for 
creating need (advertising or propaganda). In science/philosophy/spirituality, doubt 
instead represents an attitude of accepting ambiguity and uncertainty (with an open 
mind; as prods to questioning). Can we stand questions and dialogue rather than 
answers and polemics? 
 
 The capacity for doubt might well be the most spiritual of our natural capabilities 
as human beings. Doubting our beliefs, our capacities, the potential for our hopes to be 
realized, the continuation of our own existence, and the structures and meanings assigned 
to objects and people by any given culture – this doubt provides us a glimpse of our 
finitude, of the genuine and valuable uncertainty that underlies our boastful dogmas. 
Philosophers and religious thinkers, mystics and religious practitioners find themselves 
drawn to dogmatic utterances meant to cover up the insistent voice of doubt. Yet doubt is 
not our enemy. 
 Descartes turned to doubt as a friend and advisor in his attempt to find a single 
point upon which to erect a monument of truth. The subsequent history of philosophy 
has, of course, shown his enthusiastic certainty to be misplaced. But many have admired 
and drawn upon his method. The method did not begin with him. Who can say which 
solitary thinker or which conversation between people in earnest pursuit of some truth 
first brought to light the deep and enduring value of questioning that which seems most 
obvious? The entire history of human thought owes its presence and its hopes to the 
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method of doubt. Yet as a method it shows certain signs of fracture and wear that the 
more prominent thinkers often try to cover with a tapestry here and a new paint job there. 
Its dangers lie not in doubt itself but in our play with it. 
 C. S. Peirce (1868) points out that that the Cartesian doubt that one brings in as a 
prop only to dispense with it moments later (revealing its use as a magician’s rather than 
a logician’s tool) weakens one’s arguments.4 Paolo Freire (1998) notes in his critical 
assessment of a banking education that the curiosity with which we begin to learn gets 
systematically frozen out by icy answers that do little to address the pulsating warmth of 
our genuine doubts. Freire then suggests the deep significance of developing what he 
terms “epistemological curiosity” as part of our individual development toward freedom.  
 Nishitani takes aim at a central problem in Cartesian doubt by saying that it 
remains too shallow, protecting answers already assumed rather than dredging the depths 
of our need to know, to control, to maintain our certainties that are pathetically uncertain 
despite our wishes otherwise. Spirituality begins from these hints and hopes to unfold the 
reasons we cannot put answers first, the reasons we cannot use spirituality to uphold our 
domains of power and surface control, the reasons we cannot place maintaining the status 
quo at the heart of any true form of spirituality.  
The great doubt pointed to by Nishitani uncovers a fissure at the heart of human 
life and culture that no amount of plastering over can disguise. Spiritual need arises from 
the truth of uncertainty. Allegedly spiritual notions that remove ambiguity or that place 
the spiritual in the service of commerce will never ring true. They cannot because they 
must always hide from doubt, turn it into a marketing tool, or blame its presence on 
excessive materialism rather than on our humanity itself. But the hidden will always 
emerge from its exile, the tool will turn upon its maker, and the blame that falls so 
effortlessly from the rhetoricians lips will slip to reveal the self-inflated but ordinary 
human figure behind the curtain. Doubt cannot be eradicated as though it were some 
rootless weed. It is instead the ground, the rain, the sun, and the tender cultivator of the 
human condition. 
Doubt too is the ground in which this critique is rooted. Fundamentally, we 
contest the notions that the project of modernity leads to global development as 
stewardship or more incredibly, redemption. In this way we engage in the struggle for 
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modernity. Agamben (1998) points to the biopolitical as the prime mover of modernity 
with a disturbing ultimate destination, the concentration camp. Far from redemption, this 
analysis of the modern project comes out of recognition of that relation between 
sovereignty and the creation of subjects. As cited earlier, sovereignty as a form of power 
is legitimated through forces beyond mere law (Foucault 2003). Sovereign power lies in 
the state of exception, or, that position of power that necessarily lies outside of the 
jurisdiction of law (i.e. the right to execute, the right of conquest, or in contemporary 
terms, executive or congressional privilege). Too many contemporary examples exist of 
the expanding domain of the state of exception to spend time detailing them here, but 
what remains important is the possibility for doubt in the critique of this horrifying path. 
Agamben however seems to presage the project of spiritual capital when he notes, “the 
sovereign is entering into an ever more intimate symbiosis not only with the jurist but 
also with the doctor, the scientist, the expert, and the priest” (Agamben, 1998, p.122). 
The intimate symbiosis of the biopolitical indeed seems to point to the ultimate 
structure of control.  
  [F]rom this perspective, the camp—as the pure, absolute, and impassable  
biopolitical space (insofar as it is founded solely on the state of exception)—will 
appear as the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity, whose 
metamorphoses and disguises we will have to learn to recognize. (Agamben, 
1998, p.123) 
 
But, if this process of modernity is inevitable, what good can then good come from 
recognizing “metamorphoses and disguises?” Could it be that even Agamben has doubt 
as to the outcomes of these complex forces? It would seem so and we, in the construction 
of this paper, came also to ask “why then are we not there?” in response to his mapping 
of the route to the concentration camp. Here we return again to the “Great Doubt” and 
the “underlying mystery” of how subjects find voice, struggle against structures that seek 
to define them, and come to wonder about how the world might be different — taken 
broadly, spiritual questions all. 
 
4. Wonder: Wonder points to wonders – the unexplained as well as the inexplicable. 
How do we allow wonder to open avenues of escape (points of resistance) from 
under the crushing weight of Modernity, Utility, an
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Socrates says that his mission from the gods revealed that no one was wiser than 
he because he alone seemed to be aware of the poverty of his knowledge. Plato echoes a 
similar recognition when he says that philosophy begins in wonder (1997). A. N. 
Whitehead concludes that philosophy not only begins but also ends in wonder (1968). 
Certainly we can say the same for spirituality. Any alleged spirituality that turns away 
from wonder to make of religion another tool for our use has failed to comprehend the 
deep need we have to recognize the inexplicable at the heart of the World. 
 We view the world and ourselves as object or subject under the aspect of control, 
from within the reign of certainty. We make “things” and “selves”; we are creators of a 
World with clearly delimited boundaries and clear-cut rules. Yet in controlling, reigning, 
making, creating we fall prey to the very power we wield. The “Modern” world of 
enlightened rationality ends, Agamben says, in the concentration camp, in the bare, 
merciless hand of sovereign biopower. The usefulness of things and persons points a 
skeletal finger toward emptiness when the uses of usefulness open before us – opening to 
means and purposes that must be named yet resist the naming. Doubt reminds us of all 
that we fail to know and of the failure of knowledge itself when within it the sovereignty 
of control and certainty is revealed. So in the end we find ourselves approaching wonder. 
 Yet how may we approach wonder, the ever-receding view of openness or 
emptiness (Nishitani, 1983) before which the mirage of control and sovereignty, of 
objects and subjects grows dim. Do we turn wonder into another means of control, 
another aspect of power relations through which we “master” the unknown? Or do we 
escape from “grand narratives” only to ground our lives in and even revel in a new reign 
of naked power that escapes the chains of reason only to be bound by the chains of 
unconsciousness? Certainly philosophy and spirituality begin in wonder and, most likely, 
end there as well. Does wonder become the new tool of unbridled ignorance, of the 
sovereignty of force, or of a kinder, gentler form of economic co-opting of government, 
education, and daily life? 
 We end not with the answer to all life’s mysteries, nor with a shrug of the 
shoulders to the ways of power, but with a plea for questions and ambiguity, for the 
openness of wonder in the face of that which might but must not replace outer with inner 
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obedience. Wonder sets the stage for educational practice, a practice that denies the noble 
lie, that asks what lies beyond usefulness, beyond the concentration camp, beyond the 
objects and subjects of knowledge. We do not know; we wonder, and, wondering, seek a 
doorway into diversity, ambiguity, and complexity, without apology but with courage. As 
M. C. Escher wrote, “He who wonders discovers that this is in itself a wonder” (2001).  
 
It is almost as if, starting from a certain point, every decisive political event were 
double-sided: the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their 
conflicts with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but 
increasing inscription of individual’s lives with the state order, thus offering a 
new and more dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power from which they 
wanted to liberate themselves. (Agamben, 1998, p.121) 
 
“Crushing weight” is right! But even Agamben begins with the “it is almost as  
if;” It is but not quite. Wonder lies in the incompleteness of these processes of 
subjectification at work in the expanding reach of economism. It seems quite convincing 
(at least to these authors) that these “dreadful foundations” are indeed being laid by 
projects like those tying spirituality to capital; but even so, just as intriguing is the 
subsequent question, “why then are we not there?” Why are we not in the camp? This 
alone provokes wonder and, perhaps, avenues of escape.  Bill Reynolds, a curriculum 
theorist working through Delueze, suggests that our work in conceptualizing schooling 
should ultimately, 
be about developing new lines of flight. Line of flight (becomings) that allow, 
however contingently, briefly, or momentarily for us to soar vertically like a bird 
or slither horizontally, silently like a snake weaving our way amid the constant re-
configurations, co-optations and movements of the ruins. (Reynolds, 2003 p.94) 
 
 The effort to conflate spirituality with global capitalism is without doubt a co-
optation but as we stand on the ruins of what once seemed outside the reach of the vulgar 
rhetorics of development, we should always look for that line of flight, those becomings 
that momentarily provide escape. It is the expansive nature of global capital that creates 
its counterpoint — what Lefebvre calls “the incessant to and fro;” what Hardt and Negri 
call “Multitude.” This constant interactive movement pushes us from the thinking of 
“either/or” into the “yes/and?” of lines of flight, possibility. It is here that not only do we 
revel in the wonder but the wonder of wonders, hope. 
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We’re told businesses have souls, which is surely the most terrifying news in the 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 For the sake of preserving the dialogic nature of this project, the philosopher’s 
responses will be in normal font while the educational researcher’s responses will be 
presented in italics. 
2 For a comprehensive, thoughtful investigation of many of those difficulties, see 
Amartya Sen, (1987, 2000, and 2004). 
3 See Sen for an economist’s attack on these standard claims of economics. 
4 “We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which 
we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to 
be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be 
questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real 
doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has 
formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up” (1868 p. 140).  
 
